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Federal Agency Access To Grand Jury Transcripts
Under Rule 6(e)
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) 1 governs the disclosure
of federal grand jury materials. Codifying the common law presumption of secrecy,2 the rule prohibits disclosure, with certain limited exceptions.3 One exception allows disclosure "when so directed
1. Rule 6. The Grand Jury

(e) Recording and Disclosure of Proceedings.
(l) Recording of Proceedings. All proceedings, except when the grand jury is deliberating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by an electroni~ recording device.
An unintentional failure of any recording to reproduce all or any portion of a proceeding
shall not affect the validity of the prosecution. The recording or reporter's notes or any
transcript prepared therefrom shall remain in the custody or control of the attorney for
the government unless otherwise ordered by the court in a particular case.
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the
government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this
subdivision shall not disclose matters occuring before the grand jury, except as otherwise
provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person
except in accordance with this rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a
contempt of court.
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand
jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be made to (i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty;
and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's
duty to enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this
paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than assisting
the attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce
federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall promptly provide the district
court, before which was impaneled the grand jury whose material has been so disclosed,
with the names of the persons to whom such disclosure has been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand
jury may also be made (i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring
before the grand jury.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure
shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may
direct.
(4) Sealed Indictments. The federal magistrate to whom an indictment is returned
may direct that the indictment be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been
released pending trial. Thereupon the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shall
disclose the return of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and execution
of a warrant or summons.
Amendments to Rule 6 are under consideration, but have not yet received the approval of
the Standing Committee, and do not include any proposed revisions of the 6(e)(3)(C)(i) exception. See 30 CRIM. L. REv. (BNA) 3001-06 (Oct. 21, 1982).
2. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 n.9 (1979); United
States v. Tager, 638 F.2d 167, 168 (10th Cir. 1980).
3. The rule is bifurcated, authorizing disclosure without a court order in some circumstances, and requiring a court order in others. Disclosure without a court order can be made
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by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding."4 Federal administrative agencies rely on this exception when
they seek grand jury transcripts5 for use in civil law-enforcement inunder Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) to an "attorney for the government," and under 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) to government personnel assisting the attorney in criminal law enforcement activities. The phrase
"attorney for the government" is a term of art defined by rule 54(c) to include the Attorney
General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a U.S. Attorney or an authorized
assistant of a U.S. Attorney. FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(c). The U.S. Attorney may also designate
other federal government attorneys as "Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys" under the broad
authority of 28 U.S.C. §.515(a) (1976). Disclosure pursuant to court order is allowed if the
request is made "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding" under
6(e)(3)(C)(i), or if the defendant makes a showing that grounds exist to dismiss the indictment,
under 6(e)(3)(C)(ii). Rule 6(e)(2) makes improper disclosure punishable as a contempt of
court.
Although this Note is concerned only with the interpretative difficulties surrounding federal agency disclosure petitions under rule 6(e)(3){C)(i), it is worth noting that rule 6(e)(3)(A)
has generated.confusion as well. It is well settled that U.S. Attorneys may disclose grand jury
materials under 6{e){3)(A)(ii) to federal agency personnel in order to assist in criminal law
enforcement, provided that agency personnel do not later put this information to civil uses.
See, e.g., United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 563 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Perlin, 589 F.2d
260, 267 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336, 1350 (N.D. Ill. 1979);
United States v. Dondich, 460 F. Supp. 849, 856 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 445 F. Supp. 349, 350 (D.R.I. 1978). See generally Comment,Adminislrative Agency Lawyers' Presence in the Grand Jury Room: Rules to Prevent Abuse, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 159 (1979).
It is not clear, however, whether grand jury material may be disclosed without a court order to
Department of Justice Civil Division attorneys under 6(e)(3)(A)(i). The Fifth Circuit has concluded that since 6(e)(3)(A){i)'s language does not expressly preclude disclosure for civil purposes, unlike 6(e)(3){A)(ii)'s language, disclosure is authorized. In re Grand Jury, 583 F.2d
128 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); accord, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 505 F. Supp. 979 (D.
Me. 1981). The Ninth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion, and held that automatic
disclosure to Civil Division attorneys is not contemplated by 6(e)(3)(A)(i). Sells, Inc. v. United
States, 642 F.2d I 184, I 190 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3875 (May 4, 1982) (No.
81-1032); accord, In re Grand Jury, September 20, 21, 22 and 25, 1967, 82 F.R.D. 70, 73
(N.D.W. Va. 1979).
4. See note I supra.
5. This Note will focus on requests for disclosure of transcripts, which are the most sensitive grand jury records. The Note will not consider the separate problems posed by requests
for documents. Most courts consider a petition for documents to fall within rule 6(e)'s scope,
though that conclusion is not uniformly shared. Compare United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp.
1336, 1350 (N.D. Ill. 1979) and SEC v. Everest Mgmt. Corp., 87 F.R.D. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (documents fall within rule 6(e)) with United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 291 (7th
Cir. 1978) and United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622, 627 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975) (documents
may not fall within rule 6(e)). Courts tend to require a less stringent showing of need by
document petitioners on the theory that documents do not reveal what transpired in the grand
jury room. See, e.g., Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 772 n.2 (7th Cir. 1977); In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co. II), 518 F. Supp. 163, 168 (E.D. Wis. 1981);
United States v. Saks & Co., 426 F. Supp. 812,814 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). One court has said that a
showing of "particularized need" may not be required to obtain grand jury documents. In re
Grand Jury Investigation (New Jersey), 630 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1980). The proper approach is
one that considers the purpose for which documents are sought. If the documents are sought
for their "intrinsic value," that is, for their own sake and not to find out what took place before
the grand jury, they should be disclosable. See United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc.,
280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1960); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 505 F. Supp. 978 (D. Me. 1981);
United States v. Monsour, 498 F. Supp. 895 (W.D. Pa. 1980). See also In re Grand Jury
Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (congressional subcommittee
granted access to documents); Comment, Civil .Discovery of.Documents Held by a Grand Jury,
47 U. CHI. L. REv. 604 (1980) (proposing that document discovery requests be channelled
through the original owner).
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vestigations. Agency petitions for disclosure, however, raise difficult
questions about the meaning of this exception. Although the rule
plainly contemplates some disclosure of transcripts to assist civil law
enforcement efforts, such disclosure gives• rise to fears that the government may abuse the grand jury's great powers for civil discovery.Federal agencies request access to grand jury transcripts because
grand juries often investigate matters in which the agencies have an
important law enforcement interest.6 Where, not uncommonly, civil
and criminal prosecutions involve the same alleged wrongdoing, the
grand jury's record offers a valuable source .of information to the
agencies.7 Consequently, agencies persistently seek transcripts of
grand jury testimony to reduce the expense8 and supplement the
records9 of their own investigation.
The agencies claim that their petitions for disclosure properly fall
within the exception as requests made "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding." 10 The courts have not agreed
upon a consistent interpretation of this phrase, but most opinions
relate its applicability to the certainty with which judicial review will
follow agency use of the transcripts. 11
This Note criticizes the certainty-based approach, and proposes a
construction of rule 6(e) which would result in disclosure whenever
an agency establishes that:
(1) Administrative enforcement action is subject to judicial review as a
matter of law, without regard to the factual probability that such review will in fact occur;
(2) An affirmative absence of abuse characterizes the conduct of the
grand jury investigation, i.e., that legitimate criminal law enforcement
purposes inspired the grand jury inquiry; and ·
(3) The agency has particularized need of the materials requested.

Part I examines the courts' current certainty-based perspective, and
rejects this approach because it sacrifices important interests in civil · - -6. For example, both criminal and civil penalties are prescribed for the so-called "economic" crimes, such as price fixing, tax evasion and securities fraud. See Hassett, Ex-parte
Trial JJiscovery: The Real Vice ofParallel Investigations, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1049, 104950 (1979); Pickholz & Pickholz, Grand Jury Secrecy and the Administrative Agency: Balancing
Effective Prosecution of White Collar Crime Against Traditional Sofeguards, 36 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1027, 1031 (1979).
7. Because economic crimes are felonies, the fifth amendment requires indictment by
grand jury prior to prosecution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. I.
8. See Brief for Appellant at 17-18, United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
9. See, e.g., In re June 20, 1977 concurrent Grand Jury Investigation, J. Ray McDermott &
Co., 622 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1980) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) [hereinafter
cited as In re J. Ray McDermott & Co.]; In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller
Brewing Co. II), 518 F. Supp; 163, 168 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (Internal Revenue Service); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Securities and Exchange
Commission).
IO. See note I supra.
I 1. See notes 19-28 infra and accompanying text.
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law enforcement and judicial consistency for speculative and coincidental reductions in grand jury abuse. Part II defends the proposed
standard by arguing that it comports with the language and intent of
the rule while more effectively advancing the policy interests in civil
law enforcement and grand jury secrecy.
I. The Failure of Certainty-Based Standards

Whether an agency requests grand jury transcripts pursuant to a
subsequent independent investigation12 or in following its own involvement in the grand jury proceeding, 13 court-ordered disclosure
depends on two determinations. Under rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i), the agency
must petition for disclosure "preliminarily to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding." 14 If the request falls within this exception, the
agency must make a further showing of "particularized need," i.e.,
that in the instant case, the benefits of disclosure exceed the costs to
grand jury secrecy. 15 The court will order disclosure if it decides that
12. The agency is then contacted, either by the grand jury itself or by some other body, and
is urged to begin its own investigation into alleged civil violations uncovered by the grand jury,
See, e.g., In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1980) (referral to
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission by New York State Public Service Commission); In
re Disclosure of Testimony Before Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 283-84 (8th Cir. 1978) (referral
to Nebraska Commission on Judicial Qualifications et al by grand jury).
13. This occurs when the United States Attorney directing an ongoing grand jury determines that agency expertise is required for the grand jury to intelligently consider the materials
before it. See, e.g., Coson v. United States, 533 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Evans, 526 F.2d 701 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); SEC v. Everest Mgmt. Corp.,
87 F.R.D. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979);
Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
The U.S. Attorney is allowed by Rule 6(e) to disclose grand jury materials to other government personnel for the purpose of assisting the criminal law enforcement process. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii); see INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL - ADMINISTRATION (CCH)
§ 9267.1(3) (1981). Since the prosecutor and the grand jurors usually are not expert in such
highly technical areas as tax and antitrust, agency personnel must assimilate and interpret
documents and testimony. See 406 F. Supp. at 1105; In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc,,
53 F.R.D. 464, 468 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Note, Administrative Agency Access lo Grand Jury Materials, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 162, 172-73 (1975).
14. The exception under rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) pertains only to cases where the U.S. Attorney
seeks expert technical assistance; rule 6(e)(3)(C)(ii) allows disclosure only to a defendant requesting that the indictment be dismissed. Thus, Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) is the only exception which
the agencies can rely on in support of their disclosure requests.
Congressional committees occasionally seek grand jury materials for their own investigations, also relying on Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i). The courts have not decided whether a congressional
hearing is preliminary to a judicial proceeding. Compare In re Report and Recommendation
of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974) (House Judiciary Comm.
granted access) with In re Grand Jury Investigation of Uranium Industry, 1979-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) ~ 62,798 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1979) (Senate Judiciary Comm. denied access), One writer
has suggested that Rule 6(e) should be amended to expressly authorize disclosure to congressional committees when the committee can show specific need. Note, Congressional Access lo
Grand Jury Transcripts, 33 STAN. L. REV. 155 (1980).
15. "Particularized need" refers to an additional showing which the agency must make
before disclosure will be allowed under rule 6(e). The test was read into the rule by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). In order to
satisfy the test, the petitioner must show that the need for disclosure outweighs the need for
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the request meets the particularized need test.
A.

Current Approaches

The courts have not adopted any consistent interpretation of rule
6(e)(3)(C)(i)'s exception for disclosure requests made "preliminarily
to . . . a judicial proceeding." 16 The phrase provides no readily discernible standard, and the circuit courts have varied widely in their
approaches to it. 17 Certain trends, however, have emerged. The majority of courts, presumably concerned with the potential for grand
jury abuse if the government may easily satisfy the standards for disclosure, 18 require a reasonably high degree of certainty that a court
secrecy in the case at hand. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222
(1979); L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 6:128 (1966). Although the test has developed generally in the context of private litigants, there is little doubt
that it applies to public agencies. See Note, JJisclosure of Grand Jury Materials Under Clayton
Act Section 4F(h), 19 MICH. L. REV. 1234, 1256 & n.82 (1981). The test is described in greater
detail at notes 105-22 iefra and accompanying text.
16. The courts are not alone in their confusion; a recent study found that government
attorneys and law enforcement agents often do not know what grand jury materials are to be
kept secret. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MORE GUIDANCE AND SUPERVISION NEEDED
OVER FEDERAL GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS 5 (GGD-81-18) (1980); see Winer, Grand Jury
JJ/sclosures Scored, NATL. L.J., Nov. 17, 1980, at 3, col. 1. Similarly, the Criminal Justice
Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee conducted a survey
of disclosure policies followed by U.S. Attorneys' offices prior to the 1977 amendments to Rule
6(e). The subcommittee found that there was "no consistent practice" concerning what, when,
and to whom information could be disclosed. H.R. REP. No. 195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5
(1977).
11. See cases cited at notes 19-28 i'!fra. This is not surprising, for the Supreme Court has
provided little guidance in this area. The Court has decided only a few cases regarding petitions for disclosure under rule 6(e). Most of these cases deal with particularized need, see, e.g.,
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360
U.S. 395 (1959); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); cf. United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233-34 (1940) (disclosure will be allowed where the
ends of justice so require). The only case arguably construing 6(e)(3)(C)(i)'s language is Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979). See note 41 infra. The court has
been reluctant to hear grand jury cases generally. See Granelli, JJefense Peers Into Grand
Jury, Natl. L.J., June 22, 1981, at 1, col. 1. The Court, however, will have the opportunity to
clarify the confusion in this area when it decides In re The Special February 1975 Grand Jury,
652 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1981), supplemented 662 F.2d 1232, cert. granted, United States v.
Baggot, 50 U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) (No. 81-1938). The case presents the question of
whether disclosure of grand jury material to the Internal Revenue Service for use in a civil tax
evasion investigation satisfies the "preliminarily to a judicial proceeding" exception. Baggot
involved a petition brought by the IRS seeking disclosure of the taxpayer's grand jury testimony. The transcripts were to be used to determine the taxpayer's civil tax liability. The
Service argued that the "preliminarily to" language of the 6(e)(3)(C)(i) exception was satisfied
because, under the procedures applicable at the time, any disagreement over the taxpayer's
liability would be automatically reviewed by the tax court. The Seventh Circuit, in considerable tension with its own precedents, see note 30 infra, found the administrative proceeding
"too embryonic, speculative and uncertain" to justify disclosure. 652 F.2d at 1309. Under the
approach defended by this Note, the availability ofjudicial review as a matter of right satisfies
the exception's threshold determination of applicability. Accordingly, the Court should reverse the Seventh Circuit and remand the case for an inquiry into particularized need and the
absence of grand jury manipulation, with the Service bearing the burden of proof.
18. This concern has not been clearly articulated, but it forms a common thread linking the
opinions. See, e.g., Sells, Inc. v. United States, 642 F.2d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
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will ultimately review the agency's action.

The cases fall into two major categories, distinguished by the analytical approach to assessing the certainty of a subsequent 'judicial
proceeding." One approach _looks to the statutory basis for the
agency's action to determine the likelihood of judicial review. 19 If
the legislation authorizing the agency proceedings suggests probable
judicial review in typical cases, the court will deem the 6(e)(3)(C)(i)
standard satisfied. Where, for example, the statute governing the
agency action provides both for appeal by right to the courts and
judicial review of all legal and factual questions, 20 the statute has
been characterized as "plainly contemplat[ing]" a judicial proceeding.21 Similarly, courts have ordered the release of transcripts to bar
committees investigating alleged ethical improprieties of judges and
lawyers, because such investigations are "designed to culminate" in
judicial proceedings.22 These courts, evidently, will infer the existgranted, SO U.S.L.W. 3875 (May 4, 1982) (No. 81-1032); Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d
1109, 1117 n.12 (7th Cir. 1975); In re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174,
1182 (E.D. Mich. 1981); United States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 60-61 (E.D. Tex. 1980); In re
Proceedings Before the Federal Grand Jury for the Dist. of Nev., 487 F. Supp. 1098, 1102-03
(D. Nev. 1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); cf. In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979) (Rule 6(e) affords protection from grand jury abuse); J.R. Simplot
Co. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Idaho (In re Grand Jury) 40 A.F.T.R.2d {PH) ~ 5001 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn by unreported order, June 28, 1977 (grand jury process can
be manipulated by agency).
19. Thus, if, as a matter of law, a judicial proceeding cannot follow an administrative
action, the exception is not satisfied. See In re Proceedings Before the Federal Grand Jury for
the Dist. of Nev., 487 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D. Nev. 1980). Administrative actions subject to
judicial review, however, have been held to fall within the exception. See, e.g., In re Special
February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1973) (disclosure allowed to
Chicago Police Department's board of inquiry); Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir.
1958) (disclosure allowed to New York City Bar Association Grievance Committee); accord, In
re Disclosure of Grand Jury_ Transcripts, 309 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (S.D. Ohio 1970) (police
disciplinary proceedings "clearly contemplate" judicial review and thus satisfy the exception).
20. E.g., In re Special February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 896 (7th Cir.
1973).
21. In re Special February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1973).
Note, however, that appeal under the Illinois scheme was not automatic. The Board of Inquiry must first have charged the officer with acts meriting dismissal or suspension for more
than 30 days, (111d the officer must have decided to initiate the appeal to the courts. See 490
F.2d at 896.
22. In re Disclosure of Testimony Before Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1978);
see United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764, 765-66 (2d Cir. 1980); Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d
118 (2d Cir. 1958).
The courts have pointed to the attorney's special position as an officer of the court, see, e.g.,
Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1958); accord, United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d
349, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764, 766 (2d Cir. 1980); In re J.
Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1980). The cases do not, however, make
clear what the standard is for determining when non-court hearings will be considered quasijudicial for 6(e)(3)(C)(i) purposes. See, e.g., In re Disclosure of Testimony Before the Grand
Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1978). Certainly the notion that bar disciplinary committee
investigations are any more judicial proceedings than are agency investigations appears to be
little more than a convenient legal fiction. But cf. United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d 349, 351
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ence of a subsequent "proceeding" from a statutory provision granting a broad right to appeal an adverse adminstrative decision,
whether or not judicial review in fact occurs.23 The cases suggest,
however, that the statute must do more than afford the right to review; it must provide for a significant judicial role in the operation of
the statutory scheme.24
The other approach assesses the likelihood of a subsequent ''judicial proceeding" as a matter of fact. 25 Courts applying this approach
have required a fairly high degree of certainty that judicial review
will ultimately take place, although they have characterized the exact
degree of certainty required in various terms. 26 These cases may require a showing that the requisite judicial proceeding is actively being sought.27 A few recent cases go so far as to suggest that only
absolute certainty of a subsequent judicial proceeding will satisfy the
rule. 28
Both approaches turn on the probability of ultimate judicial review, although they rely on different bases for estimating that
probability. This focus on the certainty of subsequent judicial action
significantly limits the number of 6(e) petitions that satisfy the exception, for both approaches require a fairly high probability of re(D.C. Cir. 1980) (bar disciplinary proceedings are judicial proceedings because bar committees
act as an arm of the courts).
23. Cf. In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 652 F.2d 1302, 1311 (7th Cir. 1981) (Pell,
J., dissenting in part) (plain wording of 6(e)(3)(C)(i) authorizes disclosure even where subsequent judicial proceeding is not a practical certainty), cert. granted, United States v. Baggot, 50
U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) (No. 81-1938).
24. See notes 21 & 22 supra. To "plainly contemplate" or to be "designed to culminate" in
judicial proceedings involves more than the possibility of a court challenge to agency action.
Such language suggests that the underlying statute must evince an expectation of judicial review in typical cases.
25. See In re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1180 (E.D. Mich.
1981), and cases cited therein.
26. The projected sequence from administrative to judicial proceedings must, for example,
be a "clear pathway," In re Grand Jury Matter, 495 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1980); the
judicial review proceeding must "flow naturally" from the administrative action, In re Grand
Jury Investigation of Uranium Industry, 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 62,798 (D.D.C. Aug. 16,
1979), or the court must "reasonably anticipate" the subsequent proceeding, Patrick v. United
States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1117 (7th Cir. 1975) (dictum). Conversely, some courts have said that
subsequent judicial review must be, at the least, "more than a remote potentiality." United
States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 60 (E.D. Tex. 1980); accord, In re J. Ray McDermott & Co.,
622 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1980).
27. See In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1980); In re April 1977
Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1181 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (by implication); United
States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 59 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
28. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Wright II), 654 F.2d 268, 271-73 (3d Cir.
1981);In re Disclosure of Evidence Taken Before Special Term Grand Jury Convened on May
8, 1978, 650 F.2d 599, 601 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 59 (E.D.
Tex. 1980); cf. In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743, 751 (D.
Md. 1978) (materials sought must be related to a "specific existing or contemplated judicial
proceeding").
•
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view. 29 The courts generally30 have struck the balance between civil
law enforcement and grand jury secrecy largely in favor of the latter
interest. 31

B. A Critique of the Current Approach
Whether the courts base their estimate of the likelihood of a subsequent judicial proceeding on the statutory scheme authorizing the
administrative action or on extrinsic factual evidence of the likelihood of ultimate judicial review, this Note rejects the current certainty-based approach. 32 Three considerations contribute to this
critique. First, neither the language nor the legislative history of the
rule requires estimating the likelihood of judicial review as a precondition of disclosure. Second, the various certainty-based standards
bear no rational relation to the prevention of grand jury abuse.
Third, the certainty-based approaches seriously neglect the impor- .
tant policy interest of effective civil law enforcement.
29. Whether judicial review must be "plainly contemplated" on the face of the authorizing
statute, or must "flow naturally" from the agency's action, the courts require what amounts to
a strong showing of its probability. See cases cited in notes 22 & 25-28 supra. In re Special
February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973), allowed the most lenient
standard of disclosure. In that case the court read rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) to be satisfied whenever
the administrative action was subject to full judicial review.
30. This grouping of the cases may impose a fictitious coherence on the existing decisions.
The circuit courts' use of conclusionary terms to describe the appropriate scope of the excep•
tion has left the trial courts without a principled basis for applying the rule. Left to their own
devices, the district courts have, not surprisingly, applied the exception inconsistently. Com•
pare In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury, 652 F.2d 1302, 1305 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, United States v. Baggot, 50 U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) (No. 81-1938) (description
of district court's order) and In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F.
Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1978) with In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co. II),
518 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Wis. 1981) and In re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp.
1174 (E.D. Mich. 1981) and United States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Tex. 1980). Such
inconsistencies can appear even in the opinions of the same appellate court. Compare In re
Special Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973) (statute providing for officer's
right to appeal adverse action of police review board "plainly contemplates" judicial review)
and Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1117 (7th Cir. 1975) (no abuse of trial court
discretion in releasing testimony to Internal Revenue Service where judge could "reasonably
anticipate" judicial review) with In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury, 652 F.2d 1302, 1308
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, United States v. Baggot, 50 U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) (No.
81-1938) (automatic appeal to Tax Court does not satisfy exception because IRS investigation
"too embryonic, speculative and uncertain").
31. If rule 6(e)(C)(i) is not satisfied, the agency's particularized need arguments will not be
considered by the court. See, e.g., United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Federal Maritime Commission); In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); In re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F.
Supp. 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (Internal Revenue Service); United States v. Young, 494 F.
Supp. 57 (E.D. Tex 1980) (Texas State Medical Examiners). In these types of cases, therefore,
disclosure will mechanically be denied no matter how compelling the agency's need.
32. Most of the cases adopt a standard requiring more than a reasonably high degree of
certainty; since there is no uniform standard, however, this Note will use that term to refer to
all of the cases using certainty-based standards.
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1. The Rule Itself JJoes Not Require Certainty
If Congress had manifested the intention to strike a new balance
between the competing interests of civil law enforcement and grand
jury secrecy, that intention would control judicial interpretation of
rule 6(e). A cartful examination of the rule's language and legislative history, however, reveals no such intention. Consequently, the
courts are free to shape their own approach, guided by the broader
policy purposes Congress did express in the language and history of
the rule.
The rule's wording, permitting disclosure "preliminarily to" a judicial preceding, involves an inherent paradox.33 Whenever a court
orders disclosure, the possibility exists that no judicial proceeding
will follow the administrative action. The agency may decide not to
act, or the parties subjected to an adverse administrative action may
decide not to appeal. The agency and the suspected wrongdoers may
agree to a settlement. These developments, in retrospect, reveal that
the court did not order disclosure preliminarily to a judicial proceeding, contravening the rule. Similarly, whenever the court declines to
order disclosure because a subsequent judicial proceeding appears
insufficiently certain to satisfy the exception, the ultimate occurrence
of judicial review may reveal, in retrospect, that the agency did seek
disclosure "preliminarily" to a judicial proceeding. Thus, unless a
subsequent judicial proceeding is either precluded or required as a
matter oflaw, the application of the rule which will prove ultimately
correct is unknowable, and the courts will inevitably, if unintentionally, violate its terms.
As a matter of probability, the standard resulting in the fewest
such retrospectively revealed violations would deem the exception
satisfied whenever a subsequent judicial proceeding appears more
likely than not, rather than requiring any greater degree of certainty.34 A more reasonable response to this analysis, however,
would simply reject a literal interpretation of the exception. A certain absurdity inheres in any interpretation of a procedural rule by
which the correctness of its application depends on arbitrary circumstances or the discretion of the parties. In any event, the mere language of the rule in no way suggests requiring a high probability of a
subsequent judicial proceeding in preference to any other standard.
The distinction between "in connection" and "preliminarily to"
casts further doubt on certainty-based standards. If a judicial proceeding precedes or will certainly follow the disclosure request, the
petition is "in connection" with the proceeding, and the "prelimina33. See note I supra.
34. This is because the decision not to disclose when the agency's petition falls within the
exception violates the rule just as disclosure does when the exception is not ultimately satisfied.
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ri1y" phrase adds nothing to the exception.35 The rule's legislative
history36 reveals that the "preliminari1y to" clause appears in the
rule three drafts after the judicial proceedings clause. This reinforces the suggestion that Congress intended the "preliminari1y to"
exception to encompass disclosure in situations not involving an extant or certain subsequent proceeding.37
The congressional revision of rule 6(e) in 1977 did nothing to
undercut this conclusion, and seems largely to have neglected the
exception. 38 The legislative record reflects a concern, not with the
3S. See In re Special February, 197S Grand Jury, 6S2 F.2d 1302, 1310 (7th Cir. 1981) (Pell,
J., dissenting in part), cert. granted, United States v. Baggot, SO U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982)
(No. 81-1938). Such an interpretation would render superfluous the remainder of rule
6(e)(3)(C)(i)'s exception, which allows disclosure "in connection with" a judicial proceeding,
See note I supra. The common meaning of "connection" is that two things are joined or
linked together. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 240 (1974). Implicit in this notion
is the existence of the two things. The phrase "in connection with" therefore implies that the
judicial proceeding for which disclosure is petitioned is already in existence.
Since the 6(e)(3)(C)(i) clauses are joined by the disjunctive "or," the section implies that
each addresses a different situation. Therefore the "preliminarily to" language must contemplate some degree of uncertainty, since only existing proceedings are certain.
36. See note I supra. The exception's legislative history similarly does not require an analytical approach based on certainty. The earliest drafts of rule 6(e) allowed disclosure "in the
course of judicial proceedings." The first draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
was dated September 8, 1941. L. ORFIELD, supra note IS,§ 6:1, at 339. This draft contained
no secrecy provision resembling the eventual rule. The first mention of disclosure appeared in
the fourth draft, dated May 18, 1942. It prohibited disclosure of any testimony "except when
required or permitted in the course ofjudicial proceedings." The rule took on its present form
in the seventh draft (referred to as the first preliminary draft), dated May, 1943. Rule 7(e)
provided for disclosure when "so directed by the court preliminary to or in connection with
another judicial proceeding. . . ." Id., § 6:1, at 344. Only one person commented on this
phrase to the Advisory Committee; he urged that the exception should not extend to civil
actions. L. ORFIELD, supra note IS, § 6:2, at 348. See also Berge, The Proposed Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 42 MICH. L. REV. 3S3, 361 (1943).
Rule 6 of the eighth draft (second preliminary draft), dated February, 1944, adopted the
exception in its present form: "a" was substituted for "another," and the grammatically correct "preliminarily" replaced "preliminary." Again, one person commented on this phrase,
urging that federal administrative proceedings should be considered ''.judicial proceedings,"
but that state court proceedings should not be so considered. The phrase was adopted unaltered by the Supreme Court in 1946, and has never been amended. L. 0RFIELD, supra note IS,
§ 6:3, at 3S0-S2. See general{)' Orfield, The Federal Grand Ju,y, 22 F.R.D. 343, 3S7-60 (19S9).
37. Since the "preliminarily to" clause was not added to the rule until three drafts after the
''.judicial proceedings" clause appeared it is reasonable to presume that the "preliminarily to"
language was considered independently, and that it was intended to modify the exception's
scope. Had the rule's drafters merely left unmodified either the phrase "in the course of judicial proceedings" or its final draft analogue "in connection with a judicial proceeding," there
would be little doubt that the judicial proceeding referred to must be in existence. The most
reasonable inference, therefore, is that "preliminarily to" was added to mean judicial proceedings not yet in existence. If the drafters had intended a certainty requirement, they could have
imposed one. Instead, they substituted "a judicial proceeding" for "another judicial proceeding," perhaps apprehending that a certainty requirement could be inferred from the word "an•
other." See note 36 supra.
38. The major revisions to rule 6(e) in 1977 did not alter the exception's wording. See 123
CONG. REC. 2S, 194-9S (1977) (statement of Rep. Mann). The revision's legislative history
further reveals that
The Senate Judiciary Committee report accompanying the amending bill to the floor
states that the Congress possessed no intent to preclude the use of grand jury-developed
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certainty of subsequent judicial action, but with the policies underlying the rule - the prevention of grand jury abuse and the facilitation of civil law enforcement.39 Thus, neither the rule itself nor its
legislative history requires the courts' current approach. Nor do the
Supreme Court's opinions concerning the rule add much support to
certainty-based standards.40 Thus, only the furtherance of the polievidencefor civil law eeforcement purposes. On the contrary, there is no reason why such
use is improper, assuming that the grand jury was utilizedfor the legitimate purpose of a
criminal investigation. Accordingly, the Committee believes and intends that the basis for
a court's refusal to issue an order under paragraph (C) to enable the government to disclose grand jury information in a non-criminal proceeding should be no more restrictive
than is the case today under prevailing court decisions.
S. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
527, 527-29 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Three observations may be made about this
passage. First, there is no language explicitly limiting such disclosure with respect to the certainty of a subsequent judicial proceeding. Second, the major qualification upon the civil use
of grand jury material comes not from the nexus between disclosure and judicial proceeding
but from a requirement that the grand jury's purpose be legitimate. Third, the "prevailing
court decisions" referred to in the Committee's report do not employ a certainty standard, nor
do they support an inference favoring that standard. The committee referred to United States
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), and Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of
Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa 1976). S. REP. No. 354, supra, at 8 n.13, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 532. Neither of these cases contains any
reference to the certainty of subsequent judicial proceedings. The Co=ittee cites to pages
683-84 of Procter & Gamble; this part of the opinion holds that the particularized need test is
required prior to disclosure, and goes on to state that the grand jury's investigative powers may
not be used for civil purposes. 356 U.S. at 683-84. The Committee made no specific page
reference when it cited Hawthorne; that case dealt with procedural safeguards required when
the U.S Attorney sought to employ expert outside assistance during an ongoing grand jury
investigation -essentially a 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) problem, not a 6(e)(3)(C)(i) issue. Hawthorne's relevance to 6(e)(3)(C)(i) petitions may be its underlying concern that the grand jury's process not
be misused by government agencies. See 406 F. Supp. at 1122-25.
Four other major cases which could arguably be called "prevailing" had been decided at
the time the Senate report was written. In re Special February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk,
490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973), and Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958), discussed at
notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text, allowed disclosure when the administrative action
was subject to judicial review. In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1973), was a case where
disclosure was allowed despite there being no pending judicial proceeding; in fact, the Second
Circuit seemed to create its own exception to rule 6(e). Finally, In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962), denied disclosure to the Federal Trade Commission for use in an
ex parte administrative hearing. The case law, therefore, is ambiguous and does not offer
persuasive support for a certainty-based standard.
On all three counts, then, the legislative history fails to provide support for a certaintybased standard.
39. See notes 36-38 supra.
40. Some decisions have suggested that dicta in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest,
441 U.S. 211 (1979), requires that the trial court see some hard evidence of the subsequent
judicial proceeding's certainty before finding 6(e)(3)(C)(i) fulfilled. The Court declared that
"[p]arties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show that the material they seek
is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding. . . ." 441 U.S. at 222;
see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Wright 11), 654 F.2d 268, 271-72 (3d Cir. 1981); In re
Petition for Disclosure of Evidence, 650 F.2d 599,601 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Young,
494 F. Supp. 57, 59 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
These opinions place too much reliance on a casual co=ent by the Court. The use of the
word "another'' to modify proceeding was explicitly rejected by the drafters of the rule, see
note 36 supra, and reading a certainty requirement into the rule by inserting the term would
reduce the "preliminarily to" clause to redundancy with the "in connection with" clause.
Moreover, preventing "possible injustice in another proceeding" need not require a high de-
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cies behind the rule can justify judicial reliance on the certainty criterion.41 A careful policy analysis, however, suggests that the current
approach taken by the courts does little to preserve the integrity of
the grand jury process while seriously neglecting important civil law
enforcement interests.
2. Certainty-Based Standards Bear No Rational Relation to the
Prevention of Grand Jury Abuse
The law is settled that the government may not initiate or conduct a grand jury investigation for purposes of civil discovery. 42 Although rooted in somewhat anachronistic assumptions about the
distinctions between civil and criminal regulations, 43 this fundamental principle enjoys enduring vitality. Essentially, both the government and potential defendants have a greater stake in uncovering the
truth of a criminal matter than of a civil matter; society will tolerate
the exercise of certain powers44 to separate the innocent from the
gree of certainty of subsequent judicial proceedings. The mere possibility of proceedings and a
showing of particularized need would suffice to establish the possibility of injustice without
disclosure.
Even assuming that "another" is read into the rule, predictive certainty of future proceedings would not be required. The rule's actual wording, "preliminarily to a judicial proceeding," obviously involves another proceeding when disclosure is sought to further a nonjudicial,
i.e., agency, proceeding. Consequently, even a sweeping reading of the IJouglas dictum does
little to clarify what likelihood of "another" proceeding must be shown to trigger disclosure.
41. When the wording of a statute admits of various possible interpretations, the courts
must seek the intention of the legislature in the statute's structure and underlying purposes. A
recent study capsulized the process by observing that "those who would properly apply a statute must seek to fulfill the substance of its policy within the framework of its text." J. HURST,
DEALING WITH STATUTES 46 (1982).
42. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas, April 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d I 103, 1108 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
971 (1979); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
43. When the government attempts to punish a corporation, it will often have either civil
or criminal penalties available for the same misconduct. In such a situation, typical of agencysought disclosure cases, the illegal conduct and the form of punishment (since corporations
cannot be imprisoned) are the same whichever type of prosecution the government elects. By
contrast, the purely criminal focus of the grand jury arose when criminal punishment (frequently capital) and the offenses giving rise to it differed profoundly from their civil counterparts. See, e.g., Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. I, 1-2 (1972); Pickholz &
Pickholz, supra note 6, at 1028-29.
44. Conducting open-ended investigations, issuing subpoenas which are difficult for witnesses to quash, compelling the production of evidence, and operating free from formal rules
of evidence are examples of these powers. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-45
(1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972); Boudin, supra note 43, at 12-15; Note,
supra note 13, at 177; Note, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures and Problems, 9 CoLUM. J,L.
& Soc. PROBS. 681, 686-99 (1973). See also Nitschke, Reflections on Some Evils of the Expanding Use of the Grand Jury Transcript, 31 ANTITRUST L.J. 198, 203 (1968) (calling the
grand jury the most powerful inquisitorial body in our free society). Furthermore, since the
grand jury adjudicates no rights, witnesses are not entitled to counsel during the hearing, see In
re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957); In re Grumbles, 453 F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1971), cert
denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). But cf. Lurie, How Justice Loads the Scales Against Big Corporations, FORTUNE, Dec. 29, 1980, at 86 (favoring a rule allowing counsel in the grand jury room),
Witnesses may not cross-examine other witnesses, see United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 97 I,
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guilty that it will not tolerate to separate the liable from the
nonliable.45
Because the grand jury enjoys greater investigative powers than
do administrative agencies,46 its record will include information inherently beyond the reach of their civil discovery. Even where the
agencies could theoretically build an identical record by relying on
their own investigative powers, however, disclosure under Rule 6(e)
greatly reduces the administrative and financial costs of such duplication.47 These investigative advantages explain why 6(e) disclosure
advances civil law enforcement and tempts government officials to
abuse the grand jury's powers for purposes of civil discovery.48
Presumably, a concern with this potential for abuse underlies the
courts' requirement for considerable certainty of subsequent judicial
proceedings.49 Yet a high probability of judicial revision bears no
rational relation to the likelihood of abuse. 50 Grand jury abuse takes
980 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), nor may the accused present any defense,
see United States v. Salsedo, 607 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Scully, 225
F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955);In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D. Minn. 1979). But see Arenella, Reforming the
Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 569 (1980) (arguing that the target defendant should have an
opportunity to present exculpatory evidence). In short, the grand jury is allowed to make
"massive intrusions on freedom and privacy" because these powers are necessarily commensurate with its task. United States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Note, supra
note 13, at 177.
45. This proposition is implicit within the constitutional status of the grand jury: the grand
jury's criminal law enforcement role is expressly stated in the fifth amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. V, cl. 1. The Constitution does not evince a similar concern for civil law enforcement.
Civil sanctions, moreover, further reflect this proposition: they usually take the form of fines, a
less serious sanction than imprisonment.
46. This result presumably occurs because of the grand jury's greater investigative power
as compared to the agencies. See L. 0RFIELD, supra note 15, § 6:107, at 473; Note, supra note
13, at 176.
47. This cost saving is quite often an important motive behind an agency's disclosure request. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 37, United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir.
1980); In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 169 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Disclosure of
Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co. II), 518 F. Supp. 163, 168 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
48. Manipulation is made possible by the prosecutor's relative unfamiliarity with the economic crime statutes' most technical details. This unfamiliarity arguably leads the prosecutor
to rely on assisting agency experts for advice about what witnesses and evidence to subpoena.
See In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury, 652 F.2d 1302, 1307 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, United States v. Baggot, 50 U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) (No. 81-1938); J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States Dist. for the Dist. of Idaho, 40 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) f 5001 (9th Cir.
1977), withdrawn by unreported order, June 28, 1977; Note, supra note 13, at 180-81. This
argument assumes that the prosecutor, and not the grand jurors, dictates the investigation's
course. A number of commentators subscribe to this view. See L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY
45-56 (1975); Abourezk, The Inquisition Revisited, BARRISTER, Winter 1980, at 19; Antell,· The
Modern Grand Jury: Beknighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A. J. 153 (1965). Moreover, the
argument that the prosecutor exercises too much control over the grand jury is not new. See
Chaplin, Reform in Criminal Procedure, 1 HARV. L. REV. 189, 190-91 (1893).
49. See note 25 supra.
50. A certainty standard does not alter the nature of the decision confronting an agency
expert who is tempted to steer the prosecutor toward civil law areas. The expert, under a
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place before the grand jury has completed its work; the reasonable
certainty standard looks only to the use of grand jury materials after
the grand jury has returned its indictment or no bill. If abuse has
occurred, the standard does nothing to rectify it. Nor does the certainty of subsequent judicial action add to the chances of exposing
abuse, for the judicial hearing on the rule 6(e) petition itself ensures
judicial oversight of grand jury propriety-in all cases where disclosure is sought.
Admittedly, minimizing the probability that the grand jury record will prove of ultimate use to the ~gency diminishes the expected
rewards of abuse. An outright ban on the administrative use of
grand jury minutes, or the absolutely arbitrary denial of disclosure in
a high percentage of cases, would work the same result. 51 But Congress has expressed the intention to allow disclosure for civil law enforcement purposes in certain cases. 52 The courts must fashion an
interpretation of rule 6(e) to minimize abuse within this parameter,
but they may not substitute their judgment for the legislature's con,ceming the wisdom of disclosure per se. To the extent that the certainty standard discourages abuse by automatically denying
disclosure without regard to the likelihood of abuse in particular
cases, it amounts to just such a judicial excess.
Moreover, good reasons exist to doubt that an across-the-board
reduction in the likelihood of the civil availability of transcripts will
have much impact on the prevalence of abuse. Since the certainty
standard neither eliminates nor varies the odds of disclosure, agency
officials have no incentive not to influence the grand jury for purposes of their own investigation. 53 Even where formal disclosure is
certainty standard, knows that the likelihood of a subsequent judicial proceeding is not at all
affected by a decision to manipulate. Therefore the cost of manipulation is essentially unchanged by certainty-based standards.
51. To take an extreme example, simply requiring an agency to win a coin flip before filing
a disclosure petition would reduce the expected rewards of manipulation by fifty percent, for
such a procedure would reduce the probability of gaining access to the grand jury transcripts
by half. Few, however, would defend this policy as a rational method of deterring grand jury
abuse.
52. The Senate Report's explicit approval of disclosure practices no more restrictive than
those currently applied manifests this intention. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978,
at Baltimore, 581 F.2d 1103, II 10 (4th Cir. 1978) (Rule 6(e) approves ''.judicially supervised
discovery of grand jury materials to government agency personnel for civil law enforcement
purposes"); Hassett, supra note 6, at 1054; notes 36-38 supra.
53. In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1980), illustrates the point. In
Mcl)ennoll, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sought access to federal
grand jury transcripts in order to investigate alleged price overcharges by natural gas pipeline
manufacturers. Although the FERC possessed statutory authority to bring an injunctive action in federal district court, it elected instead to first file a 6(e) disclosure petition as a means
of avoiding investigation costs. The Fifth Circuit held that the mere existence of the FERC's
authority to seek an injunction did not satisfy the "preliminarily to" language, and denied the
petition. The court added, however, that "[a]n injunction action in federal district court would
undoubtedly satisfy the '.judicial proceeding' requirement of rule 6(e)." 622 F.2d at 171. Apparently, the Commission needed only to seek the injunction in order to fall within rule
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completely precluded, unscrupulous agency officials have much to
gain from diverting the grand jury to civil purposes. 54 Honest but
overzealous officials who abuse the grand jury process because they
convince themselves, erroneously, that this abuse serves a legitimate
criminal investigative purpose probably arrive at this delusion without precisely calculating the advantages it offers. And scrupulous
officials will not abuse the grand jury's powers no matter what the
standard for disclosure. .
Analysis of the risks of grand jury a_buse thus reveals only a tenuous case for certainty-based standards. A more rational approach to
grand jury abuse would look directly at the evidence of possible
abuse on a case-by-case basis, rather than assume that the likelihood
of judicial review somehow relates to the risk of such abuse.
3.

Certainty-Based Standards Neglect the Important Interest in
Civil Law E'!forcement

Reliance on a certainty-based standard exacts a heavy social cost
in foregone or more expensive civil law enforcement efforts. 55 Areasonable certainty standard limits the number of petitions which will
meet the "preliminarily to . . . a judicial proceeding" language, because only those petitions where the court concludes that the subsequent judicial proceeding is quite likely will satisfy the exception. In
certain cases, therefore, the courts will summarily reject disclosure
petitions premised on legitimate agency need, even where no suggestion of grand jury abuse exists. This imposes an obvious cost to civil
law enforcement.5 6
6(e)(3)(C}(i)'s exception. If this is the case, then the rule's applicability turns not on any inquiry into possible grand jury abuse, but only on an administrative choice between legal strategies. It is difficult to imagine how this could act to discourage FERC personnel from
manipulating any future grand jury investigation.
54. Such officials can make sub silentio use of grand jury discoveries, which can be useful
to the agency either as informal investigative tips or as formal evidence conveniently discovered by subsequent "independent" efforts. See, e.g., Note, Administrative Agency Access To
Grand Jury Material Under Amended Rule 6(e), 29 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 295, 327-29 (1978).
The best deterrent to this sort of misconduct is a direct inquiry into the purposes of the grand
jury investigation, with the agency bearing the burden of proof. Such a specific deterrent
would impose a cost on grand jury manipulation itself, rather than crudely reducing the benefits to manipulation by indiscriminately limiting disclosure.
55. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
56. The cost of this sacrifice can take two forms. As one alternative, the agency could incur
the out-of-pocket costs of conducting its own investigation. The investigation's opportunity
cost is likely to be less funding for or complete foregoing of another civil investigation. Even 1f
the agency successfully duplicates the grand jury's investigation, therefore, civil law enforcement proceedings in other areas will not take place. In the second case, the agency may be
unable to duplicate the grand jury's investigation because records have been destroyed, see
Bell & Schneider, Critical Steps in Handling a Government Investigation, 36 Bus. LAW. 643, 659
(1981), witnesses cannot be located, or the statute of limitations has nearly run out. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL - ADMINISTRATION (CCH) § 9267.22(l)(c) (1981).
The cost, then, is more direct: agency civil law enforcement action is foregone, and
whatever interest existing therein is forfeited. In some cases that loss can be substantial. E.g.
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The courts should not underestimate those costs. Since disclosure would not benefit the agency unless the grand jury and agency
investigations concern the same alleged wrongdoing, the social interest in preventing the harmful conduct is identical, whether the government proceeds against it civilly or criminally. Ensuring that the
government will have only criminal sanctions at its disposal in a
given case imposes serious costs on the government, the defendant,
and the criminal law itself.57 Congress has recognized the legitimacy
of these concerns by explicitly approving disclosure to the agencies. 58
Absent a significant countervailing interest, the important advantages of disclosure to aid civil investigations mandate rejection of
restrictive, certainty-based interpretations of Rule 6(e). This in tum
suggests the need for an alternative interpretation.

II.

AN ALTERNATIVE STANDARD: THE AVAILABILITY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW

This Note proposes an interpretation of rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) under
which the court would order disclosure of grand jury transcripts
whenever the administrative agency establishes:
(1) the possibility, as a matter of law, that its actions will be reviewed
in a subsequent ':iudicial proceeding;"
(2) the affirmative absence of grand jury abuse; and
(3) particularized need for the transcripts requested.
The courts can then reconcile the competing interests, while employing familiar limiting devices to minimize the costs of disclosure. 59
In re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (potential dispute involving approximately $300 million in income tax liability).
57. For the government, the likelihood of a more intensely defended prosecution increases
the litigation costs of enforcement, while the expense of imprisonment adds to the cost of
success. For typical economic offenders, a felony conviction and resulting prison sentence can
be devastating. See, e.g., Pelaez, Of Crime -And Punishment: Sentencing the White-Collar
Criminal, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 823 (1980). The importation into the criminal law of the consequence-oriented standards of economic regulation, moreover, tends to erode that institution's
sensitivity to the moral guilt of the individual as the touchstone of criminal liability. See generally F. ALLEN, REGULATION BY INDICTMENT (1979). Indeed, the evolution of administrative
law reflects the felt need for noncriminal approaches to economic misconduct. Ultimately, it
may make little sense to "limit" governmental power to the exercise of the most coercive and
expensive sanction it commands.
'
58. See notes 36 & 38 supra.
59. In making this proposal, the Note builds upon the rationales of In re February 1971
Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973), and Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118 (2d
Cir. 1958). Conlisk allowed disclosure where the statute involved provided for de novo judicial
review as a matter of right. This Note proposes that disclosure be allowed wherever any judicial review may, as a matter of right, be obtained. Even when only review of legal issues is
available, modem administrative procedures afford ample procedural protections in the fact
finding process, and there is no threat that individual rights will be adjudicated without thorough testing of all grand jury-generated evidence used. See note 68 i'!fra and accompanying
text.
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The Advantages of the Proposed Standard

The advantages of predicating disclosure on the possibility of judicial review largely parallel the defects in the certainty-based approaches. First, the proposed standard would eliminate a great deal
of confusion. Trial judges would not ri.eed to make metaphysical
judgments about whether or not a statute "contemplates" judicial review,60 or speculate about.the probability that administrative litigation will find its way into the courts.61 The trial judge need only
consider a single question of law, a question ~he court is best qualified to answer. 62
Second, by facilitating disclosure whenever the agency establishes the absence of grand jury abuse, the alternative standard
would further the civil law enforcement interests neglected by the
certainty approach. Permitting the agency to demonstrate particularized need, rather than summarily dismissing disclosure petitions
because of the insufficient likelihood that proceedings will follow,
would effectively shift the focus away from the arbitrary probability
of subsequent proceedings and instead require the courts to forthrightly compare the need for disclosure with the risk of abuse. The
certainty-based standards can approximate such a balancing only by
accident; the judicial review standard proposed here would place this
comparison of the real interests involved at the core of the disclosure
decision.
B.

Objections to the Judicial Review Standard

Four principal objections may be raised against the approach advocated by this Note. First, easier agency access to grand jury material might imperil the right of individuals to judicial safeguards
against unreliable grand jury evidence. Second, the increased opportunity for civil use of the grand jury's record might increase the
incentives for government officials to pervert the grand jury process
to advance civil investigations. Third, more liberal disclosure standards might confer excessive investigative power on administrative
agencies. Finally, expanded disclosure may imperil the policy interests protected by grand jury secrecy. While plausible, these objections, even collectively, do not justify rejecting the significant
advantages offered by the judicial review standard. Indeed, the proposed approach more effectively addresses valid apprehensions of
excessive disclosure by making such concerns a central focus of the
disclosure hearing's inquiry.
60. See cases cited in notes 20-23 supra.
61. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
62. See S. REP. No. 354, supra note 38, at 8, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
NEWS at 532.
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I. The Right of Individuals to Judicial Scrutiny of Grand Jury
Evidence
Because the judicial review standard will lead to more frequent
disclosure of grand jury transcripts, and because an actual judicial
proceeding will often not follow such disclosures, the proposed standard may _inspire fears that individuals may suffer adverse administrative decisions without judicial scrutiny of this less-than-reliable
evidence. Similar fears may arise when the available judicial review
is limited to matters oflaw. 63 In either case, evidence gathered without regard to its probity, 64 and unsubjected to judicial scrutiny, will
influence the administrative proceeding. This result arguably contravenes both the language of the rule and the policy behind it.
Several arguments render this objection ultimately unpersuasive.
The language of the rule offers no less support for the judicial review
standard than for any other, given the inherent possibility that anticipated judicial proceedings will not materialize. Approaches requiring certainty, moreover, lead to a parallel offense to the rule's literal
meaning whenever the courts deny disclosure but judicial review in
fact occurs. 65 The most reasonable approach to the paradox con. tained in the rule's wording is to admit that "preliminarily" implies
certain contingencies. Absent further congressional guidance, no
reason exists to find legal possibility an inferior gauge of those contingencies than any other measure of certainty.
Second, the judicial review standard ensures, as a matter of law,
the ultimate availability of judicial oversight of agency actions. In
general, the object of the investigation, and not the agency, will control the decision of whether to exercise the right of appeal to the
courts; the agency will not appeal its own decision. Thus whenever
the agency acts adversely to an individual, that individual will have
recourse to the courts under the judicial review standard. Where the
agency takes no action, thus leaving nothing to appeal, it does not
adjudicate the individual's rights unfavorably, and the unavailability
of review inflicts only minimal injury.66 Even under deferential
standards, the certain availability of judicial review of unfavorable
agancy actions provides an important initial safeguard of individual
63. E.g., In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1980).
64. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24, 31 n.11 (2d Cir.
1981); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955);
Nitschke, supra note 44, at 305-06.
65. See note 33 supra and accompanying ~ext.
66. It might be argued that disclosure implicates an individual's privacy rights without
formal adjudication when the agency takes no appealable action, but the disclosure decision
itself is subject to the rule 6(e) inquiry, which under the proposed approach would requit;e
agency proof of particularized need and the affirmative absence of manipulation.
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adjudicative rights. 67
Third, formal agency adjudicative hearings provide the same array of truth-testing devices available in a judicial proceeding.68 The
agency hearings division, rather than the investigative division, will
conduct these proceedings.69 Functionally, then, an agency hearing
offers the same means to test the probity of evidence obtained from
grand jury records as does a judicial proceeding, while the structural
independence of those conducting the hearing suggests no improper
motivation sufficient to induce a less-than-vigorous use of these factfinding t9ols. The judicial review standard thus adequately serves
the policy concerns motivating the rule's requirement of a ':iudicial
proceeding." 70
2. The Risk of Grand Jury Abuse
The proposed judicial review standard is significantly broader,
67. Even under deferential standards of review, arbitrary or capricious agency action is
grounds for reversal by the courts.
68. First, in some cases the agency may not impose any sanction without going to court.
E.g., In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting the Natural
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717s (1980)). In these cases, the transcripts' probative value will be
tested in a judicial proceeding; thus the problem will not arise.
Second, in cases where the disclosure petition is filed in anticipation of a formal agency
adjudicative hearing before an administrative law judge, the very same panoply of truth-testing procedures are available as in a court trial. See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN, & H. BRUFF,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 28-29 (2d ed. 1980). Indeed, these hearings are nearly "carbon
copies of judicial trials." Counsel represents each side; witnesses are cross-examined; objections may be raised; and the agency will be put to its proof. Id at 29. Indeed, the "grossly
excessive use of trial procedures" has been termed one of the "major illnesses" of the administrative process. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §14:1, at 3 (1980).
69. See, id at 28; 4 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW§§ 34.01,
34.03 (1981).
70. Respected authority holds that a ''.judicial proceeding" does not include administrative
action for purposes of the rule. The prevailing definition of ''.judicial proceeding" appears in
Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d ll8, 120 (2d Cir. 1958): the
term ''.judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding
determinable by a court, having for its object the compliance of any person, subject to
judicial control, with standards imposed upon his conduct in the public interest, even
though such compliance is enforced without the procedure applicable to the punishment
of crime.
Similarly, an "investigation undertaken . . . preliminary [sic] to or in connection with the ex
parte administrative proceeding contemplated by the statute . . . is not preliminary to or in
connection with a judicial proceeding within the intendment of the rule." In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440,444 (3d Cir. 1962). The approval of existing case law in the legislative history of the revised rule, see note 37 supra, reinforces the vitality of these precedents.
But the rationale of these decisions does not support restrictions on agency access beyond
those imposed by the judicial review standard for disclosure. These opinions appeared long
before the contemporary statutory and judicial transformation of administrative procedure.
See notes 64-68 supra. Rosenberry, moreover, was decided before the Supreme Court had
read the particularized need test into the rule. Rosenberry was decided on May 8, 1958. 255
F.2d at 118. United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677 (1958), was decided on June 2.
Thus the contemporary safeguards on administrative procedure and grand jury disclosure,
coupled with the ultimate availability of judicial review of administrative action, amply satisfy
any concern for individuals' adjudicative rights.
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initially, 71 than the certainty-based standards currently applied.
Without more, this might increase the temptation to abuse the grand
jury for civil purposes.72 If the agency must show both particularized need73 and the absence of grand jury abuse, 74 however, the
number of petitions may not increase. Even if disclosure becomes
more common, this will merely reflect the true number of meritorious petitions. Thus, the incentives for abuse will diminish even as
civil law enforcement interests receive more favorable
consideration.75
The courts apparently have sought to reduce the incentives for
grand jury manipulation by making future access an unlikely
event. 76 Requiring the petitioning agency to prove that the grand
jury investigation did not in fact involve manipulation for noncriminal investigation would impose a more efficient deterrent. Existing
case law77 and Rule 6(e)'s legislative history78 provide support for
this requirement.
Several advantages have persuaded both courts79 and commentators80 to advocate this approach. First, the agency may be the only
71. The availability of judicial review establishes only that further specific inquiry should
be made into grand jury abuse and particularized need. See notes 60.62 supra and accompanying text. The agency must carry its burden of proving the last two elements, as well, before
disclosure may be obtained.
72. See In re Special February, 197S Grand Jury, 6S2 F.2d 1302, 1307 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, United States v. Baggot, SO U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) (No. 81-1938); Robert
Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, l 124-2S (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Iiz re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., S3 F.R.D. 464, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1971); cf. Bradley v.
Fairfax, 634 F.2d 1126, 1129 (8th Cir. 1980) (broad reading of "preliminarily to .•• a judicial
proceeding" invites indiscriminate disclosure to a wide variety of agencies).
13. See text following note 111 i'!fra.
14. See text following note 77 i'!fra.
7S. Certainty-based standards do not efficiently deter misuse. See text at notes 48-S3 supra.
In applying the standards, trial courts presently do not inquire uniformly into the possibility of
grand jury misuse, compare In re Grand Jury Matter, 49S F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (no
inquiry made into grand jury misuse) and In re Proceedings Before Federal Grand Jury for
Dist. of Nev., 487 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Nev. 1980) (no inquiry into misuse) with In re Disclosure
of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co. II), SIS F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (finding the
government had met its burden of proof by showing it had not misused grand jury) and In re
April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, S06 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (finding the government had properly used grand jury in a good faith investigation of possible crimes), despite the
issue's relevance to disclosure petitions.
16. See notes 48-S3 supra and accompanying text.
77. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 3S6 U.S. 677, 683 (19S8); United States v.
Birdman, 602 F.2d S47, S63 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, at Baltimore, SSI F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th Cir, 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Patrick v. United
States, S24 F.2d 1109, lll6 n.12 (7th Cir. ·197S).
18. See notes 36-37 supra.
19. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, at Baltimore, S81 F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller
Brewing Co. II), SIS F. Supp. 163, 166 (E.D. Wis. 198l);In re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, S06 F. Supp. 1174, 1177 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
80. See Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 747 (Sth
ed. 1980).
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party in court. Rule 6(e)'s legislative history suggests Congress' expectation that most disclosure hearings would be ex parte. 81 In such
cases, the court is not exposed to the development of the issues
through the adversary process. 82 Requiring the agency to overcome a
presumption of misuse partially offsets this loss. Second, in typical
cases, only the agency will possess the information necessary to carry
the burden. 83 The agency will have worked with the United ~tates
Attorney on the investigation and will likely have records of the
agents involved, the extent of disclosure to them, and the suggestions
made regarding what course the grand jury should take. 84 In contrast, the party resisting disclosure, if any, will not have access to
such evidence. Requiring this party to prove misuse would effectively frustrate the disclosure inquiry's purpose to prevent abuse. 85
Third, the agency is subject to a powerful institutional incentive
favoring grand jury manipulation. 86 Utilizing a pre-existing grand
jury record offers a cost-effective alternative to financing a separate
investigation. 87 The agency can learn that grand jury investigation
materials are quite useful;88 from there it is a short step to directing
SI. See S. REP. No. 354,supra note 38, at 8,reprintedin U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS at
532. Although this practice is by not means universal, many disclosure petitions are heard ex
parte. See In re April.1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Mich.
1981); In re Grand Jury Matter, 495 F. Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1980); In re December 1974
Term Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743, 744 (D. Md. 1978); United States v. Doe,
341 F. Supp. 1350, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
82. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 495 F. Supp. 127, 134 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
83. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings on
R.R. 5864 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (testimony of Bernard J. Nussbaum) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
84. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL - ADMINISTRATION (CCH) § 9267.3(1)
(1981).
85. Requiring that the party resisting disclosure prove misuse would be a heavy burden.
First, such a requirement implicates all of the problems associated with proving bad faith. See
Y. KAM1sAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, supra note 80, at 745-46. Second, the out-of-pocket
costs incurred will likely work a hardship on the resisting party. See House Hearings, supra
note 83, at 157 (testimony of Bernard J. Nussbaum).
86. An agency seeking to pursue a civil charge against a party must make a decision about
how to gather the necessary preliminary information. An organization will often choose the
"first feasible solution" available to it. See R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY
OF THE FIRM 120-22 (1963); Coffee, "No Soul to lJamn, No Body to Kick'~· An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 396 (1981). Since the
agency is already aware of the grand jury investigation, its decisionmaking process may well
stop there. This proposition assumes that any organizational conflicts with respect to undertaking the civil investigation have been resolved. See R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra, at 86.
It could be argued that since Cyert and March's work was done in the private firm context,
their conclusions do not apply to government agencies. Cyert and March reject this contention, however; in fact, they found some evidence confirming their belief that their theory accurately predicted government agency behavior. Id. at 285-86, 288.
87. This provides much of the motivation for seeking grand jury transcripts. See notes 8-9
supra.
88. See generally R. CYERT & J. ·MARCH, supra note 86, at 123-25; Starbuck, Organizational Growth and Development in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS 480 (J. March ed. 1965).
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a grand jury investigation into civil enforcement areas. 89 Placing
the burden of proof on the agency will tend to neutralize this institutional tendency toward abuse. Assuming that an absence of misuse
cannot be shown in cases where misuse actually takes place, misuse
of the grand jury process would foreclose the transcripts' later availability. Unlike the indiscriminate deterrence effected by certaintybased disclosure standards, the burden of proving grand jury propriety would specifically deter actual abuse without jeopardizing civil
law enforcement interests.
Finally, placing the burden of going forward on the agency will
minimize the costs of failing to carry the burden. 90 If the agency
must show an absence of misuse and fails to do so, and the grand
jury has been conducted for a legitimate purpose, the agency is denied disclosure. 91 While this result imposes serious costs on civil law
enforcement efforts, more dangerous consequences follow from an
erroneous presumption of grand jury legitimacy. Such a presumption rewards grand jury abuse in the absence of any evidence bearing on the question. This denies persons called to testify before the
grand jury procedural protections,92 grants the agency access to
materials it should not have obtained, 93 and creates an incentive for
future grand jury manipulation. 94 These consequences, and particularly the prospective nature of the last's effect, weigh in favor of placing the burden of proof on the agency. 95
89. This institutional incentive arises from the difference between an abuse's costs and
benefits to the agency. The costs are negligible, since the courts are not uniformly looking into
potential misuse when considering 6(e) petitions. Hence, there is little risk of jeopardizing the
disclosure petition's success. See note 51 supra. In contrast, the potential benefit, in the form
of the grand jury's detailed investigative record, can be quite great. The existence of this incentive has long been recognized. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 684
(1958) ~ttaker, J., concurring).
90. When an agency brings a disclosure petition, four possible outcomes are implicated.
These are: first, the agency did not manipulate the grand jury, and disclosure is allowed.
Second, the agency did not manipulate the grand jury, and disclosure is denied. Third, the
agency did manipulate the grand jury, and disclosure is allowed. Fourth, the agency did manipulate the grand jury, and disclosure is denied. The first and fourth results are proper; the
third result is error; and the second result is error if particularized need was shown.
91. The Note's hypothetical assumes that particularized need can be shown in each of the
cases described in note 90 supra.
92. The procedural protections are those afforded witnesses before agency hearings which
are not allowed in grand jury proceedings, primarily the right to counsel and crossexamination.
93. This results from the grand jury's superior information-gathering capability. See note
44supra.
94. See notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text.
95. Abuse is not an exotic phenomenon. For example, government agents have purposely
instituted grand jury investigations for civil investigative purposes. See In re April 1956 Term
Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956); United States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). In another case, "IRS employees not only breached grand jury secrecy, . . . but also
... made a mockery of the protective role of the judiciary .••." Sam Cohen, 42 T.C.M
(CCH) 312, 321 (1981).
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Assuming that the agency is assigned the b11:rden of proving absence of misuse, the court should consider a number of readily observable facts in determining whether the burden has been met. As
an initial matter, a grand jury investigation should be considered per
se misused if its stated purpose was to probe into civil matters.96
Second, the grand jury's failure to issue an indictment should be
considered evidence of bad faith, 97 given that the overwhelming proportion of grand juries return indictments rather than no bills.98
This evidence could be rebutted by showing that good reason existed
at the grand jury's outset to suspect that criminal wrongdoing had
occurred.99
Moreover, the courts should closely scrutinize the working relationship between the grand jury and the agency for the existence of
several factors involved in previous cases of grand jury misuse. Although presence of these factors does not necessarily suppprt an inference of misuse, their absence in whole or in part may satisfy the
agency's burden of showing no grand jury misuse.
The ultimate fact at issue is whether or not agency personnel directed the grand jury investigation into areas of purely civil interest.
Factors which the courts have considered in answering this question
include (1) identities of agency personnel involved in the criminal
and civil investigations, their responsibilities, and the dates of their
involvement with each investigation; 100 (2) the degree to which
grand jury subpoenas tend to duplicate previously issued administrative subpoenas, if any; 101 and (3) whether the agency already possessed evidence sought by the grand jury. 102 . Similarly, courts are
more likely to find misuse if the grand jury investigation is begun at
96. See United States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But cf. In re April 1977
Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1177 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (suggesting that grand
juries are often conducted with civil as well as criminal law objectives in mind).
97. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d H03, 1110 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller
Brewing Co. II), 518 F. Supp. 163, 166 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
98. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 80, at 22;
L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES§ 6:143 (1966). In fact, federal grand juries rarely return no true bills; in 1976, for example, grand juries returned approximately 23,000 indictments ·and 123 no true bills. Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R 94
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law ofthe House Judiciary
Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 738 (testimony of Benjamin R. Civiletti, Assistant Attorney General). See generally Morse,A Survey ofthe Grand Jury System, 10 OR. L. REV. 101 (1931) (the
most detailed empirical study of grand juries).
99. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
100. Sam Cohen, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 312 (1981).
101. In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 1956).
102. See In re Groberg, 453 F. Supp. 1225, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). ("that the IRS agent
previously obtained these documents supports the inference that the grand jury desires them
for its own independent investigation into possible criminal offenses rather than being used as
a tool to assist the IRS in obtaining, for a civil investigation, material otherwise unavailable to
it.").
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the agency's request. 103
None of these factors are conclusive, but taken as a whole they
are probative of misuse. A showing that the grand jury returned an
indictment and that agency personnel were involved only in evaluating evidence but not in subpoenaing or interrogating witnesses, for
example, would satisfy the agency's burden of proving no misuse. If,
on the other hand, the agency requested a grand jury shortly after an
administrative investigation had stalled, the same agents were involved in both investigations, and the grand jury subpoenas substantially duplicated the administrative subpoenas, then the agency has
offered no evidence to rebut a presumption of misuse.
In order to make such a showing in the future, the agencies may
need to reconsider their personnel assignment procedures and keep
detailed records of agents' activities. This will undoubtedly burden
the agency with a cost; however, if the expected benefit is an increased ability to prove an absence of grand jury misuse - and
hence a greater likelihood of transcript disclosure - agencies may
be willing to accept it. At least one federal agency has significantly
altered its procedures for dealing with grand juries along these
lines. 104
3. Administrative Power
Opponents of a judicial review standard also argue that the standard will result in agencies circumventing the restrictions Congress
has placed on administrative investigations. The risk arises from the
more sweeping investigative powers enjoyed by grand juries for
criminal investigations than those the agencies may invoke for civil
discovery. 105 This objection to the judicial review approach ignores
both the congressional intent of Rule 6(e) and the protections afforded grand jury secrecy by the requirement of particularized need.
Rule 6(e) has the force of statute, and plainly contemplates some
use of grand jury transcripts by administrative agencies. 106 Consequently, it makes little sense to object to an interpretation of the rule
based on congressional constraints on agency investigative powers,
for Congress has specifically expressed its intention to grant the
103. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, at Baltimore, S81 F.2d I 103 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); In re April 19S6 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263 (7th
Cir. 19S6); cf. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL- ADMINISTRATION (CCH) § 9267.22 (1981)
(procedures for Service-initiated requests for grand juries).
104. The Internal Revenue Service has since 1980 completely overhauled its regulations
regarding Service cooperation with and requests for information developed by federal grand
juries. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL - ADMINISTRATION (CCH) § 9267 (1981).
10S. See, e.g., Note, supra note 13, at 177-82. The Note's analysis and language were
adopted in Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1124
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
106. See notes 44-46 supra.
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agencies access to grand jury records. 107 Nor do the policy purposes
of restricting agency investigative powers provide a rationale for limiting disclosure of grand jury transcripts beyond the limits imposed
by the burden of disproving manipulation of the grand jury for purposes of civil discovery. Typically, the agency is familiar with the
information contained in the transcripts before requesting its formal
disclosure. 108 In these circumstances it would be perverse to frustrate civil law enforcement interests for restrictions on agency information-gathering powers which already have been sacrificed for the
sake of administrative assistance in a criminal investigation. Finally,
disclosure orders, based on the criteria of particularized need, can
limit agency access to those portions of the grand jury record that
critically relate to their legitimate law enforcement functions. 109
Such limited disclosure does more to advance the congressional purpose of civil law enforcement than it does to violate congressional
restraints on administrative fact :finding.11o
4.

Grand Jury Secrecy

The most widely apprehended fears of liberalized disclosure concern the erosion of grand jury secrecy, which would implicate important interests in preserving witness candor and avoiding unnecessary
stigma. 111 Two major arguments render this objection unpersuasive.
First, under the proposed approach, the courts would order disclosure only on a showing of particularized need, thus restricting disclosure to those cases of clear necessity. Second, disclosure to
administrative agencies poses only incremental risks of ultimate disclosure beyond the agency itself.
The particularized need test ensures that secrecy will prevail absent a compelling need for disclosure. The Supreme Court has read
107. See note 52supra.
108. When agency personnel assist the grand jury in its investigation, it seems no more
than a polite fiction to maintain that the agency itself has not gained access to information
gathered through the exercise of the grand jury's powers.
109. See note 123 i'!fra and accompanying text.
110. The differen~ between grand jury and administrative investigations, while real, may
be overstated. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950) (administrative
investigative power "is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or
controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is
being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not."); Note, Reasonable Relation Reassessed· The Examination of Private .Documents by Federal Regulatory Agencies, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 742, 749-53, 782-807 (1981) (agency investigative power so expansive that new
restrictions are required).
11 I. See, e.g., Note, supra note 13. Secrecy enhances the investigative efficacy of the grand
jury by encouraging witnesses to testify without fear of stigma or reprisal. See Douglas Oil
Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211,222 (1979); United States v. Scott Paper Co., 254
F. Supp. 759, 761 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp.
486, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (the ''willingness of a witness to speak openly without fear must not
be subordinated to any policy if the Grand Jury system is to function"). For a more general
discussion of the purposes behind grand jury secrecy, see note 116 i'!fra.
·
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the test into Rule 6(e), 112 and its principles can be easily applied in
administrative disclosure cases. Most importantly, it substantially
protects the interests of individuals in grand jury secrecy.
The test for particularized need involves two elements. First, the
party seeking disclosure must overcome the presumption of grand
jury secrecy by demonstating a "compelling" need 113 that outweighs
the importance of continued secrecy. 114 Second, the request must be
narrowly structured "to cover only material so needed." 115 The test
thus anticipates that the court consider the disclosure petition's
breadth as well as its urgency. Both of these inquiries provide significant protection against excessive transcript disclosure to federal
agencies.
The first component of the particularized need test balances the
interests in secrecy against the petitioner's need. 116 Before allowing
disclosure, the courts should require a clear demonstration by the
112. The seminal case is United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). In
that case, the government brought a civil antitrust action against Procter & Gamble under § 4
of the Sherman Act. A federal grand jury had earlier refused to indict Procter & Gamble on
criminal antitrust charges; the government thereupon used the transcripts in the civil case.
Procter & Gamble sought access to the grand jury transcripts, but its request was denied because it could not show the requisite need. The particularized need test was recently affirmed
by the Court. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979). See generally Maximov, Access .By State Attorneys General to Federal Grand Jury Antitrust Investigative
Materials, 69 CAL. L. REv. 821, 824-25 (198l)(discussing J)ouglas Oil); Casenote, The J)iscov•
ery and Production of Grand Jury Proceedings, 19 Mo. L. REV. 326 (1959) (discussing Procter &
Gamble); Recent Decisions, Civil Procedure - J)isc!osure of Minutes Wiren Grand Jury Was
· Usedfar Purpose ofPreparing far Civil Action, 59 MtCH. L. REV. 123 (1960) (critically commenting on Procter & Gamble). The reasoning advanced by the Court in Procter & Gamble
was essentially the same as that used three years before by the trial court in United States v.
Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 (D.N.J. 1955). For other discussions of particularized need, see Boudin, supra note 43, at 31-33; Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L.
REv. 455, 45~ (1965); Case·Note, Criminal Procedure - Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes
Granted to a Public Agencyfar Purposes Not in the Furtherance of Criminal Justice, 40 FORD·
HAM L. REv. 175, 176-78 (1971); Note, supra note 15, at 1251.
113. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 n.1_3 (1979).
114. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979); accord, In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Wright II), 654 F.2d 268, 271-72 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Disclosure of
Evidence Taken Before Special Grand Jury Convened on May 8, 1978, 650 F.2d 599, 601 (5th
Cir. 1981). .But see Note, The Use of Grand Jury Transcripts in Private Antitrust Litigation: An
Argument far Automatic Access, 58 TEXAS L. REV. 647 (1980).
115. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979).
116. Five goals are considered in determining the secrecy presumption's weight. These
are: (l) preventing th~ escape of those under investigation; (2) minimizing the likelihood of
interference with the grand jurors; (3) preventing any tampering with witnesses; (4) encouraging free and uninhibited testimony by witnesses; and (S) protecting the innocent accused from
stigmatization and the cost of a needless defense. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops North•
west, 441 U.S. 211,219 n.10 (1979); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,681
n.6 (1958). Recognition of these five goals can be traced back through United States v. Rose,
215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954) and United States v. Amazon Ind. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d
254, 261 (D. Md. 1931), to nineteenth century state cases. See Recent Decisions, Criminal
Procedure - Secrecy of Grand Jury Proceedings - Accessibility of Grand Jury Minutes, 37
CoLUM. L. REv. 315,317 (1937). Of these five goals, the fourth always retains weight since it
is the most important factor in protecting the grand jury's ability to function. See Douglas Oil
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agency that the information expected from the transcripts cannot be
obtained from other sources. Cost savings and efficiency gains do not
constitute sufficient need. 117 Thus, disclosure of grand jury material
appears restricted to information which the agency cannot obtain
through its ordinary investigative procedures, due to either the
greater powers of the grand jury or external circumstances. 118
The particularized need test's second element requires that petitions for disclosure do not extend beyond the claim of necessity
which underlies them, so that the veil of secrecy is lifted "discretely
and limitedly." 119 The necessity inquiry goes essentially to the gravity of the disclosure request; this second element goes to its scope.
Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211,222 (1979); Y. l<AMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 80, at 716-17.
In the context of agency disclosure petitions, the secrecy presumption remains quite heavy.
First, the interest in encouraging testimony is unusually strong. Corporate entities are often
the targets of grand jury and agency investigations into economic wrong-doing. E.g., In re
Grand Jury Investigation ofCuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Bates,
627 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re J. Ray McDemott & Co., 622 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1980); In
re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1981). In order to
succeed, grand juries must rely heavily on testimony of employees having inside knowledge of
statutory violations. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958);
Note, supra note 15, at 1262. These witnesses are especially jeopardized by disclosure, for the
"corporate employer . . . has greater incentive and power to retaliate than anyone else." Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1977); see Douglas Oil. Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211,222 (1979). Moreover, the witness' business relationships, and therefore his
livelihood, could be disrupted by disclosure. Brief for Appellees at 17, United States v. Bates,
627 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Second, the reputational interest is similarly quite high. Economic crime investigations
often extend over long periods of time and gather great amounts of material. E.g., In re Grand
Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1981); In re April 1977
Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D.Mich. 1981). Consequently, large
numbers of innocent individuals may be mentioned before the grand jury who are unaware of
any investigation. These persons presumably have an interest in maintaining secrecy because
they could conceivably be seriously harmed by disclosure of hearsay. See Illinois Petition v.
Widmar, 1980-81 Trade Cas. ~ 78,103, 78,108 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Note, Civ11 JJiscovery of JJocuments Held by a Grand Jury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 604, 619 (1980); Note, Release of Grand Jury
Minutes in the National JJepostion Program of the Electrical Equipment Cases, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 1133, 1141 (1964). Two courts of appeals have acknowledged that witnesses have an
interest in preventing disclosure of their testimony. See Petrol Stops Northwest v. Continental
Oil Co., 647 F.2d 1005, 1009 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Disclosure of Testimony Before the
Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 284-85 (8th Cir. 1978).
117. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). A case can be
made for allowing disclosure, in the interests of convenience, of documents in the grand jury's
possession which would be subject to administrative subpoena. Given that the agency will
obtain these records anyway, the privacy interests of those who provided them to the grand
jury would not seem to justify imposing a needless cost on the government. The relevant
inquiry concerns whether the agency seeks the documents for their intrinsic evidentiary value,
or as indicators of what took place in the grand jury room. See note 5 supra. By the same
token, however, such a rule would not address the more difficult and more important question
of when evidence unique to the grand jury's record should be made available to administrative
agencies. Given the congressional intention to make such evidence available in at least some
cases, see note 52 supra, this question cannot be avoided.
118. See United States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 63 (E.D. Tex. 1980); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
119. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
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The cases have recognized the requirement, but have not fully developed its application. The opinions tend to focus on two extremes; a
request for the entire transcript is usually considered too broad to be
approved, 120 while requests made for purposes of impeaching witnesses or refreshing memories are found to be tailored with sufficient
precision to satisfy the test. 121 The possibility that these latter functions help prevent possible injustices at trial reinforces the latter
conclusion. 122
This narrowness requirement offers a convenient solution to the
concern that agencies receive too much when they gain access to
gi:and jury transcripts. 123 The court can limit the agency's access to
portions of the transcripts that bear upon its civil investigation by
requiring the agencies to file detailed disclosure petitions which specify the agency's statutory authority to investigate, the limits to that
authority, and what the agency expects the transcripts to reveal. 124
The court can also review the transcripts themselves, to ensure that
only material relevant to the agency's investigation will be
disclosed. 125
Under this approach, the agency ";'Ould receive only information
which relates to its legitimate civil law enforcement function and
which it could not itself obtain. Within these parameters, disclosure
fulfills the purpose of Rule 6(e) by furthering civil law enforcement
without additional intrusions into individual interests protected by
grand jury secrecy.
The second consideration limiting the erosion of grand jury secrecy, beyond the requirement of particularized need, is the fact that
granting an agency's disclosure petition adds little to the existing
risks of retaliation against, or stigmatization of, grand jury witnesses.
Grand jury witnesses always run the risk of testifying at trial. 126 Dis120. See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); In re Disclosure
of Testimony Before the Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 63-64 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
121. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); In re Disclosure
of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co. II), 518 F. Supp. 163, 169 (E.D. Wis. 1981); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
122. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 221 (1979) (quoting
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)).
123. This concern is based on the assertion that access to grand jury transcripts allows
administrative agencies to circumvent the statutory limits placed on their investigative powers.
See H.R. REP. No. 195, supra note 16, at 4; Note, supra note 13, at 178-79.
124. Though this will doubtless impose a cost on the agencies, it is likely to be far less than
the cost of developing the information in a separate investigation.
125. See In re Disclosure of Testimony Before the Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 287 (8th Cir.
1978); Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1977).
126. See l C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 106, at 170-77 (1969); Calkins, The Riding Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, l J.
MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 18, 21 (1967); Knudsen, Pre/rial .Disclosure of Federal Grand Jury
Testimony, 48 WASH. L. REv. 423, 444-46 (1973); .Developments in the Law - .Discovery, 74
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closure "in connection with or preliminarily to" a private civil action
poses an additional risk. 127 A certain risk to grand jury secrecy thus
inheres even in certainty-based approaches which minimize total disclosure to agencies. Indeed, requiring a subsequent judicial proceeding may encourage the agencies to make public evidentiary
presentations they could otherwise avoid. 128
By contrast, disclosure to agencies poses little ultimate risk of revealing grand jury testimony of the sort which would inhibit witnesses. In most cases, the agencies already know the substance of the
disputed testimony. 129 Upon disclosure, this information is unlikely
to go beyond the agency itself. Most agency proceedings never reach
the adjudication stage. 130 Preadjudication discovery will rarely enable the defense to learn the details of grand jury testimony; 131 when
it does, the presiding officer can issue a protective order to avoid
compromising grand jury secrecy. 132 The incremental threat to
grand jury secrecy thus seems too remote to justify indiscriminate
denial of grand jury material to agencies that succeed in showing
particularized need. Congress, in any event, appears to have accepted some compromise of grand jury secrecy in the interest of civil
law enforcement.
HARV. L. REV. 940, 1013-14 (1961); Recent Decisions, Civil Procedure - Disclosure efMinutes
When Grand Jury Was Usedfor Purpose ofPreparingfor Civil Action, 59 MICH. L. REV. 123,
125 (1960).
127. Private plaintiffs may appear in the wake of a government investigation of almost any
economic crime, with the exception of tax offenses. Antitrust and securities are familiar examples. See, e.g., Korman, The Antitrust Plaintiff Following in the Government's Footsteps, 16
VILL. L. REv. 57 (1972); Kurland, Discovery: Its Uses and Abuse- The Plaintiff's Perspective,
44 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1975).
128. If the agency must commence a civil proceeding to obtain the grand jury records it
desires, the fruits of disclosure will necessarily become known through that proceeding. The
risks of stigma and reprisal are little less in the administrative context than they are in that of
the grand jury. See Bell & Schneider, supra note 56, at 656-67 ("You can literally win the
administrative battle yet lose the war as a result of damaging publicity."); Coffee, supra note
86, at 425; Gellhom, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1380
(1973).
129. See note 108 supra.
130. See, e.g., Claggett, I'!farmal Action - Adjudication - Rule Making: Some Recent
Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 55-56 ("Clearly, the vast bulk
of administrative policy decisions are in fact made by informal action, with the more formal
procedures occupying only a small part of the whole."); Gellhom, Rules efEvidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (''Most administrative enforcement has relied upon informal methods, including advisory letters, administrative
warnings, or settlement stipulations."); Posner, A Statistical Study ofAntitrust E'!forcement, 13
J. L. & EcoN. 365, 375 (1970) (few FTC complaints reach formal adjudication).
131. See Armstrong, Jones, & Co. v. Securities and Exch. Commn., 421 F.2d 359,364 (6th
Cir. 1970) (Commission need not furnish identity of witnesses to defense prior to agency adjudication); Dlugash v. Securities and Exch. Commn., 373 F.2d 107, llO (2d Cir. 1967) (same);
Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1971 DUKE L.J. 89, 100 n.49 ("Among agencies
with adjudicatory responsibilities, only the ffC routinely discloses its witness list prior to the
hearing.").
132. See Tomlinson, note 131 supra, at 102.
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CONCLUSION

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) embodies competing
policies. Its general rule of grand jury secrecy protects the public
both from abuse of the grand jury's powers and from potential emasculation of the grand jury as a tool for combatting crime. The rule's
exception which allows disclosure "preliminarily to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding," however, contemplates allowing use of
the grand jury's fruits for civil law enforcement purposes. Such use
necessarily threatens the policies protected by secrecy, by creating an
incentive to abuse the grand jury and by implicating the security interests of witnesses. These competing interests can best be reconciled
by reading the exception's language to permit disclosure whenever,
as a matter of law, subsequent judicial review of administrative
agency action is possible. Applying this standard will allow for a full
debate in each case over the strength of the competing interests,
leading to more principled and uniform treatment of transcript disclosure petitions.

